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FORUM
BATTLE 2000: THE NEW JET ENTRANTS VERSUS THE REGIONAL PARTNERS?

Alan R. Bender

Editor's Note: Articles printed in the Fomm section are non-refereed and express solely the opinion of their
authors.
An airline economics war that will determine the future pattern of air service in many U.S. short- and
intermediate-haul markets is under way. The megacarriers are eliminating mainline jet service on these routes
due to their high costs, inappropriate operational patterns, and restrictive labor agreements. To the dismay
of many passengers, regional partner carriers are filling the voids by raising fares and replacing jets with
"undesirable" turboprop aircraft. This paper investigates the problem's underlying causes and describes the
looming battle between new entrant jet carriers and regional partner airlines for dominance in these
important medium-size markets.
BACKGROUND

Deregulation's promise of efficient, low-fare commercial
airline service has been, to date, only partially fulfilled,
especially in U.S. second-tier markets. The proliferation
of new entrant jet airlines in the early 1980s was followed
by nearly as many bankruptcies. In addition, the wellknown trunk, local service, and intrastatejet airlines that
had survived the early deregulation years were themselves
the aggressors, or victims, in a massive consolidation of
carriers that erased the names of some of the most wellknown jet airlines in North America (Western, Republic,
Ozark, PSA, and Air Cal, among others).
By 1990, only a small number of deregulationspawned jet carriers had survived (Jordan, 1995). More
importantly, most U.S. cities were left without any
unrestricted low-fare jet service, save the score or so
cities in the southwestern United States served by
Southwest Airlines. In fact, the situation in 1990 was so
dire that the California State Senate seriously debated
whether to sponsor a state-owned jet airline to return
California intrastate ticket prices to reasonable levels
("California Senate Unit," 1990). This predicament was
particularly ironicbecause successful and time-tested lowfare California intrastate jet service was a crucial
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argument in the mid-1970s deregulation debate and the
inspiration for the founding of Texas-based low-cost
leader Southwest Airlines.
Although the California crisis was primarily
precipitated by the acquisition of historically low-cost
PSA by high-cost USAir, the problem was mitigated in a
relatively short time by the major deployment of
Southwest Airlines' equipment and other resources into
the California intrastate market.
However, most other U.S. states and regions have
not, until quite recently, been so fortunate; their low-fare
services have waxed and waned along with the fortunes
and, more typically, misfortunes of the new entrant jet
operators. The abundant though now defunct startup
carriers of the 1980s have been supplanted in the 1990s
by a new generation of low-cost, low-fare airlines
(Jordan, 1995). Many cities that lost unrestricted low-fare
jet senice in the late 1980s are again receiving flights
from low-cost airlines. In fact, the competition in many
markets has become fierce. In late 1994 American
Airlines reported that it was competing with low-fare jet
carriers in 40% of its domestic markets, up from 25% in
early 1994 and only 8% in early 1993 (O'Brien, 1994).
According to a 1994 study by the aviation consulting firm
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Simat, Helliesen, & Eichner Inc. (SH&E), low-fare
airlines were generating about 24% of the 200-400 mile
market available seat-miles (ASMs) in 1994,
approximately double their 1992share (Moorman, 1994).
For the nine-year period between 1985 and 1994, lowcost carriers increased their share of total (all markets)
U.S. domestic traffic from 3% to 13.5% (Banks, 1994).
The overall trend is unmistakable, portending, perhaps,
a watershed in the deregulated air transportation
industry.
Others have studied the counter-cyclical nature of
startup airline activity (Harraf & Vasigh, 1994). This
theory states that when economic conditions are poor,
the public may be unwilling or unable to purchase fullfare airline transportation. The theory also claims that jet
transport aircraft are easily obtained and relatively cheap
to purchase or lease during economic downturns. Finally,
the theory purports that since many commercial pilots
are out of work during recessions, they may be willing to
work for relatively low wages at unproven companies
during such times. Conversely, the theory states that
when economic conditions improve, the public will be
more likely to purchase full-fare airline transportation; in
addition, during such growth periods the supply of
aircraft and pilots dries up. The result is the gradual
demise of startup airlines during economic growth
periods.
Although this hypothesis adequately explains the
surfeit of planes, pilots, and startup jet airlines during
both the early 1980s and the early 1990s (plus, the
dramatic contraction in new entrant services in the late
1980s), it cannot account for the pro-cyclical pattern of
the mid-1990s. Between 1993 and 1995 significant
economic expansion was accompanied by tremendous
growth in low-cost service by new entrant jet airlines
(Jordan, 1995). Although only anecdotal evidence exists
to explain this trend, there is a virtual mountain of nonscientific literature, virtually all pointing toward a secular
change in air transportation's basic demand
characteristics (Aviation Systems Research Corp.
[ASRC], 1993; Banks, 1994; Bender, 1993; Phillips, 1994).
The upshot is clear: In the budget conscious 1990s,
neither leisure nor business passengers may be willing to
pay any more than what they consider a very fair price
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for an airline ticket, any airline ticket. With respect to
travel for company business, the literature is replete with
case studies of the thousands of U.S. companies that have
cut middle management positions, begun close
monitoring of company travel, entered into negotiations
with airlines for the lowest possible fares, and purchased
videoconferencing systems, all of which can severely cut
air camer revenues (Apogee Research Inc., 1994; Bryant,
1994; Raphael & Starry, 1995). It is worth noting that
business travelers have traditionally accounted for 34%
of the people flying on U.S.-registered airlines but an
estimated 70% of passenger revenues (Stephenson &
Fox, 1992). In the 1990s these percentages have
apparently changed, and every major U.S. airline has
gotten the message: reduce operating costs and therefore
average fares or cease to exist.
It is interesting to note that few if any "experts"
predicted the current situation as recently as five or six
years ago. Warren Buffett's monumental 1989investment
in USAir is evidence of the prevailing and absolutely
inaccurate wisdom at that time. One can only conjecture
that had U.S. corporations not been forced to
dramatically trim their expenses and operate their
companies much more efficiently from approximately
1990 forward, then American, Delta, United, and others
might have irrefutably won the deregulation battle with
their well-documented late 1980s practices: megamergers, hub airport creation and monopolization,
corporate ubiquity (servicing all 50 states), code-sharing,
frequent-flier bonuses, commission overrides, and
sophisticated computer reservations and yield
management software. However, in the mid-1990s
environment some of these practices have apparently
been neutralized or otherwise successfully challenged by
new competition, particularly in short-haul markets.
THE STATUS OF THE SOUTHWEST CHALLENGE
The outstanding financial performance of low-cost, lowfare leader Southwest Airlines during the recent
economic downturn, when the U.S. airline industry as a
whole lost nearly $13 billion, is convincing evidence that
a major jet airline can attract new passengers and operate
profitably even in a shrinking economy. Equally
noteworthy is that Southwest has been financially
successful while paying its employees salaries competitive
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with those of its larger brethren while also operating one
of the newest fleets of jet airplanes in the airline
business.
As has been reported in nearly every business
publication in the United States, Southwest Airlines has
consistently maintained peerless management-labor and
company-customer relations. The Southwest model or
variations of it are being cloned by new airline companies
from coast to coast: from Shuttle by United and Western
Pacific in the far West; to Vanguard in the Midwest; to
Air South and Valujet in the Southeast; to Eastwind in
the Northeast. In fact, these few names represent only a
fraction of the Southwest-inspired carriers currently
operating or in the Department of Transportation ( D O T
application process. Clearly, the stimulus for this 1990s
genesis of low-cost, low-fare air carriers is Southwest
Airlines' outstanding performance against a backdrop of
failed or precariously viable megacamers.
Comparisons of operating costs among U.S. large jet
airlines demonstrate that not only is Southwest the
nation's lowest-cost major carrier (1994: 7 cents/ASM),
but on short hauls (which comprise more than 90% of
Southwest's routes), its competitors' operating costs
(1994: about 10 cents/ASM) are more than 40% higher
than its own ("Trends," 1995). Since the megacamer
competition operates identical or near-identical
equipment and, as it is generally acknowledged that short
(under two-hour) jet flights are perceived by many
passengers as commodity services, Southwest Airlines is
selling soybeans at the same price as everyone else
(Southwest's 1994 revenue per ASM was only 9% lower
than the industry average) while paying approximately
40% less to grow them.
In the 1970s and 1980s this disparity was not
identified as catastrophic for the "grandfather" airlines,
perhaps because business people often acquiesced to
paying whatever it cost to fly on a major airline from
point A to point B and, in any case, Southwest Airlines
was a limited niche player at the time. Overambitious
expansion and/or shoddy service killed most of the other
low-cost, low-fare, early deregulation-era carriers,
including sizable People Express. Still, the 1990s business
and leisure travel climate is apparently so different from
that of the 1980s that the megacarrier airlines need to
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significantly lower their costs for short-haul operations
irrespective of direct competition from Southwest
Airlines or any other low- cost, low-fare jet camer
(Phillips, 1995). There is strong evidence today that for
shorter trips many business people drive or do whatever
else is necessary, including eliminating specific trips
altogether, if they perceive air fares to be unjustifiably
high (Rothman & Baker, 1993). Only in the 1990s have
companies begun to seriously scrutinize business travel
costs, which are typically a company's third-largest
controllable expense after salaries and data processing
(Bryant, 1994).
Although airlinetransportation is often characterized
as a long-haul business (the average passenger trip length
was 983 miles, each way, in 1994), a significant and
recently growing proportion of airline travel is short-haul:
In 1993, 14 of the 23 busiest origin and destination
(O&D) markets in the contiguous 48 states were less
than 500 miles each way (U.S. Department of
Transportation [DOT]/Air Transport Association [ATA],
as cited in Aviation Week Group, 1995). More recent
figures (12-month period ending June 30,1995) indicate
that fully 48% of U.S. domestic O&D travel occurred in
markets of 750 miles or less, each way (DOTIATA,
1995). This is clearly due to Southwest's growth and the
recent flurry of startup activity. The numbers portend
further bad news for the high-cost majors.
By their own admission, the megacarriers are
economically uncompetitivewith startups in the provision
of short-haul services. Yet their continued domination of
medium- and long-haul traffic cannot be assumed either,
even though high megacamer operating costs are
considerably mitigated by- long-haul flying. Southwest
Airlines' Chairman and CEO Herb Kelleher recently
estimated his company's ASM costs on routes of 900
miles at 4.6 cents, and 4.0 cents for 1,400-mile trips such
as Phoenix-Nashville (Velocci, 1995). If accurate, these
numbers spell additional headaches for the megacamer
competition because their long-term cost goals
(approximately 7 cents per ASM for flights in the 900mile category) pale in comparison with Southwest's
current (and very recently dropping) operating costs.
Nonetheless, it is debatable whether Southwest
Airlines would be wise to introduce a significant medium-
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or long-haul schedule. That is because many airline
passengers find real value in extras such as assigned
seating, increased legroom, onboard meals, and first- or
business-class options when the greater part of a day
must be spent on an airplane. Currently, Southwest
Airlines does not offer any of these extras. (On its short,
one-hour flights these frills are rarely missed, even by
business travelers.) In addition, Southwest's policy of
offering the most daily flights of any airline in nearly
every city-pair market it serves might be impossible to
maintain in long-haul markets. For example, while a fleet
of only two jets can provide continuous turnaround
service (every 90 minutes) between two cities located one
hour's flying time apart, it would take four jets to provide
the same 90-minute headways between two cities located
three hours distant.
According to Kelleher, Southwest has little intention
of becoming a serious medium- or long-haul player
(Velocci, 1995). Anyway, doing so would be a violation
of yet another of Southwest's basic principles: to compete
with the personal automobile, not other airlines. As there
are relatively few people in the 1990s driving great
distances for pleasure or especially business, there are
few potential auto passengers to attract to a long-haul
Southwest Airlines. Therefore, Southwest would have to
steal traffic from other airlines or expand the market
through low fares. Although Southwest could probably be
successful at both, the fact that it would have very few
auto passengers to capture would hurt its overall traffic
potential in those markets as compared with its traffic
potential in its traditional short-haul markets. In any
case, Kelleher seems content to cherry-pick specific
medium-haul routes that appear underserved by the other
major airlines, such as Phoenix-Little Rock and Las
Vegas-San Antonio. However, the very threat of a much
longer-haul Southwest cannot be dismissed entirely, if
only because of the Dallas-based carrier's phenomenally
low costs and its reputation for near flawless reliability.
No other major camer can make those claims. Therefore,
the megacarrier airlines apparently have few sacred
routes, at least on the domestic front.
PRELUDE TO BATTLE 2000
Given the current airline economic environment and the
megacarriers' natural will to survive and prosper, the
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stage is conceivably set for an unraveling of some or even
much of the U.S.airline network. For the near term, the
principal battleground probably will not be in long-haul
markets since, as demonstrated above, low-cost airlines
would have considerable difficulty amassing the planes,
perquisites, and passengers necessary for competitive
success against the big carriers. On shorter routes,
however, even a small jet airline with just a few planes
can represent real competition for a major airline in
terms of both pricing and flight frequency. mically,
thousands of prospective passengers await the
opportunity to be extricated from their automobiles and
seated on airplanes if the price is right and the city-pair
is of sufficient geographical separation and population
size. Southwest Airlines' traditional market decisions and
those of literally every one of its successful clones fit this
model to a considerable degree.
How can the megacarrier airlines with their much
higher short-haul unit costs successfully compete? Here,
too, the literature of the 1980s and early 1990s is replete
with discussions of the strategic advantages high-cost
large airlines have over low-cost small airlines, such as
fortress hubs, generous frequent-flier bonuses, massive
computer reservations systems, sophisticated yield
management software, and travel agent kickbacks
Levine, 1987; Sorenson, 1991).
(Borenstein, I=,
Because both new entrant and megacarrier short-haul
flights must begin or end at or near a medium- or largehub city for obvious economic reasons, the megacarrier
can cross-subsidize whatever losses it incurs in the local
O&D fight with the startup through its beyond traffic,
that is, passengers connecting at the hub to the
megacarrier's national and international networks.
However, the effectiveness of these strategies appears to
be of diminishing value in the austere 1990s due to
significant cutbacks in corporate travel spending plus an
explosion of low-cost new entrants and unprecedented
growth at Southwest Airlines. So trapped, the
megacarriers have no choice but to take drastic new
measures, to be examined shortly.
THE ASCENDANCE OF THE REGIONALS
Thus far, there has been little discussion of the regional
(formerly commuter) airline industry in the United
States. This rapidly growing component of the national
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transportation system has been expanding at well over
twice the rate of the U.S. airline industry as a whole over
the last decade, and today accounts for almost 12% of
domestic enplanements (ATA, 1995; Regional Airline
Association [RAA], 1995). It is not difficult to see why.
Since 1988, the major airlines have transferred more than
65% of their routes under 500 miles to the regionals
(Schmit & Ritter, 1995). Operating, for the most part,
19-, 30-, and 50-passenger turboprop aircraft, these lowwage, high-fare carriers are able to feed passengers to big
airlines at mega-hub airports for a far lower cost per
plane-mile than the majors can themselves. (More than
90% of regional carrier passengers connect to a major
airline for some part of their journey IRAA, 19951.)
Through the use of airline code-sharing agreements with
major carriers, the regionals appear to offer seamless
connections between small-town America and
metropolitan America. Code-sharing agreements and
their impact have been thoroughly examined in the
literature (Oster & Pickrell, 1988).
Of course, the total cost of operating a 30-passenger
turboprop aircraft between two cities, say, 250 miles
apart, is about 50% less than operating a 120-passenger
jet between those two places. (This illustration assumes
typical 1995 operating costs: 18 cents/ASM for a 30passenger turboprop operated by a regional airline; 10
cents/ASM for a 120-passenger jet operated by a very
efficient megacarrier airline.) Although the per seat cost
for the turboprop is more than twice that of the jet, the
fact that there are so few seats on the turboprop as
compared to the jet means that relatively little
discounting of the turboprop seats is necessary.
Furthermore, when a turboprop aircraft is used to
substitute for a jet, its much smaller capacity and higher
per seat costs also mean that many local O&D passengers
need to be shut out from the short-haul flight by high
local fares (or little local seat availability) so that
connecting long-haul passengers paying much higher total
fares can be accommodated.
It is not unusual to find city-pairs where, over the
last few years, five round-trip megacarrier jet flights have
been replaced by seven or eight round-trip regional
carrier turboprop flights (or some combination thereof,
such as five jets replaced by three jets and five
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turboprops). American Airlines has instituted this type of
operation in some medium-size markets in the Texas area
(OjkialAirline Guide, 1989, 1992, 1995). Where this
happens, flight frequency is often doubled while total
capacity is typically halved. The greater flight frequency
is potentially attractive to business people, for whom
departure time convenience is important. Such is not the
case for leisure and other discretionary travelers,
however, because they cannot normally afford the high
prices that must be charged for most turboprop seats.
This shutting out of local and discretionary travel is an
economically justified practice because of the high per
seat operating cost of turboprop aircraft, but one has to
wonder about its efficacy. Indeed, as Southwest Airlines
is able to continue providing very profitable, low-priced
jet service in the relatively large Texas markets (LubbockDallas and MidlandjOdessa-Dallas, for example) from
which American Airlines pulled its jets, it is logical to
infer that something is curiously wrong in the airline
transportation business, something beyond the realm of
straight economics.
Two points require clarification, however, before the
looming conflict can be fully explored. First, the
overwhelming majority of regional carrier routes are not
suited to jets: neither 1990s-era50-passenger regionaljets
nor 1970s-era 120-passenger Boeing-type jets. These
regional markets, as noted earlier, are predominantly
short-haul routes connecting small-town America with
large hub airports/cities. The automobile represents
extremely intense competition in these markets because
the distances involved are so short and/or the spoke cities
so small that only a high frequency schedule of flights has
any chance of pulling potential regional airline
passengers from their cars. Note, too, that the equipment
must be relatively small not only because the spoke cities
are second- and third-tier places, but also because a
massive schedule of departures is necessary in order to be
competitive with the automobile. (One can easily drive
most regional-type routes in three or four hours; in
comparison, the airplane option involves about 55
minutes of flying time, plus driving time to the airport,
for a total journey time of approximately two hours.)
Using large airplanes for such high-frequency service
would generate far more seats than the market could
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absorb. The cost per seat for this very frequent, small
aircraft service is, again, very high, around 18 cents per
mile; average fares are, of course, even higher,
approximately 40-45 cents per mile (Brooks, 1992).
Clearly, anyone in such a hurry to travel a very short
distance to save so little time is someone for whom time
is quite valuable, typically a business person. Fortunately,
since more than 90% of U.S. regional carrier passengers
connect at hub cities to major carrier jet flights, the high
prices of their regional airline legs are prorated over the
total cost of their tickets; this mitigates somewhat the
pain of the short but expensive regional flights. Still, for
most of the deregulated era the majority of passengers
using the regionals have been business people, whereas
the majority of passengers flying the majors have been
traveling for leisure or discretionary purposes.
The potential conflict arises because regional airlines'
average trip length has increased significantly over the
last 10 years: from 160 miles in 1984 to 210 miles in 1994
(RAA, 1995). This means, logically, that one-half of all
regional flights are longer than 210 miles. In comparison,
Southwest Airlines' average segment was about 375 miles
in 1994 (Velocci, 1995). This means that half of
Southwest's flights are less than 375 miles each way. The
potential conflict is manifest not simply because the
regionals are now flying some Boeing-type distances,but,
more importantly, because they are flying these longer
routes between their hub airports and more and more
medium-size (not small) cities (Fresno-Los Angeles, Des
Moines-Chicago, Portland (ME)-New York City,
Syracuse-Cleveland, Wichita-Dallas, and so on). The
major-to-regional hand-me-down route practices of the
last 10 years may be reaching an untenable state of
affairs.
The second and related point: Much has been written
recently on why the megacamer airlines are so inefficient
in providing short-haul jet service while Southwest
Airlines and its clones are able to do the job cheaply and
efficiently (Kling, 1993; Kling & Smith, 1994). Indeed,
the major airlines have been termed dinosaurs and
dysfunctionals by renowned analysts nationwide (ASRC,
1993; Banks, 1994). The reasons are numerous, but the
relevant arguments include the over-relianceon hub-andspoke route systems (and their many implications, to be
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discussed shortly), possession of far too many different
types of jet aircraft, offering a higher quality of s e ~ c e
(Macy's) on short trips than the public desires (WalMart), and archaic work rules. The problem is most acute
for short trips because it is difficult to tack all of the
megacamer inefficiencies onto the price of a presumably
cheaper ticket. The megacamers engage in this latter
practice, anyway, but are foiled whenever a low-cost
airline enters the market.
Again, the recent flood of low-cost jet airlines into
the marketplace is apparently such a threat to the majors
that they appear to be handing over routes to their
regional partners almost willy-nilly. As noted earlier,
when a regional inherits a route it tends to focus on
connecting traffic because it cannot compete for large
numbers of local O&D passengers due to its very high
per seat costs. However, the regional has so few seats to
sell that it does not have to compete for very many of the
local passengers, anyway. The problem is that the
regional carriers operate aircraft models (medium-size
turboprops in the types of markets under scrutiny) that
are demonstrably inferior to the kinds of aircraft (pure
jets) operated by even the lowliest of low-cost startup
airlines: inferior in comfort, inferior in speed, and
inferior in per seat economics (Regeski, 1995).
BATIZE 2000
The megacamers' hub-and-spoke systems are expensive
to operate but provide the flying public with frequent,
convenient connecting service between literally every pair
of metropolitan places in the United States as well as
between many smaller city-pairs. As described extensively
elsewhere, the major problem with this mode of
operation is that aircraft must sit idle at hub airports for
50-60 minutes each time they land in order to provide
boarding passengers coming from scores of other planes
with convenient, guaranteed connections (ASRC, 1993).
Obviously, planes and flight crews are totally
unproductive sitting at airport gates. The cost is quite
significant, therefore, whenever a jet has to transit a
connecting hub city more than once a day. For a
predominantly short-haul hubbing airline like USAir, the
costs can be immense. Additionally, the expense of
leasing dozens of airport gates that are used only once
every hour or two is not insignificant either. Combine
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this with the alternating peaking and ebbing of ticket
counter, gate agent, and other requirements, and a very
expensive system has been created.
The opinion of many industry analysts is that
passengers, especially business passengers, were willing or
able in the 1980s to subsidize this convenient though
expensive system by paying relatively high fares. In the
1990s, this may no longer be the case. Moreover, it is
evident that the airline industry engaged in excessive hub
building in the 1980s, exacerbating the problem. (Many
of these secondary hubs have since been closed or handed
down to regional partner airlines.)
The continuous hubbing approach Southwest
Airlines takes is altogether different. By providing
frequent flights in literally every market it serves,
Southwest offers reasonably good connections as a
byproduct. Flights are not scheduled to depart or arrive
at the same time. If they do, fine. If not, connecting
passengers may have to wait one hour, perhaps two, to
catch their ongoing flights. Southwest's primary goal is to
keep ground time to a bare minimum: 20-25 minutes
maximum.
Therefore, purposely coordinating flights is actually
undesirable. A passenger who traveled on Southwest
Airlines from, say, Sacramento to San Antonio in mid1995 would likely have had to transit Phoenix (Official
Airline Guide, 1995). Assuming a Sacramento departure
on the early morning Phoenix nonstop, the San Antoniobound passenger would have had to wait two hours in
Phoenix for the best nonstop connection to San Antonio.
If, however, that Sacramento originating passenger's
destination were Kansas City, the connecting time in
Phoenix would have been only one hour. In comparison,
the banked hub-and-spoke systems of the megacarrier
airlines literally guarantee 45-60 minute connections
between any two cities; however, this very convenient
type of service comes at a price that, especially for
shorter trips, many people are no longer willing to pay.
Some analysts have suggested that megacarriers such
as American Airlines operate hybrids of banked and
continuous/turnaround connections at their large hub
cities (Jennings, 1993). They would work something like
this: On dense, short-haul routes such as Dallas-San
Antonio and Dallas-Houston, American would operate
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continuous, quick turnaround (Southwest Airlines-style)
jet service to maximize aircraft use and overall efficiency.
On less dense, long-haul routes into Dallas from
medium-size cities such as Dayton, Hartford, and Reno,
American would continue operating banked flights
(aircraft use on long-haul services is by definition high).
In theory, the Reno-San Antonio passenger could
continue to receive adequate Dallas-connecting service
even though Dallas-San Antonio planes would no longer
be specifically banked to meet Reno-originating flights.
This is because flight frequency in markets such as
Dallas-San Antonio needs to be very high, anyway, due to
local O&D demand. However, analysts at American
Airlines and the other megacarriers have historically
argued that simultaneously operating both banked and
continuous/turnaround flights at hub cities may not work,
even at the busiest of hubs; the mixing and matching,
they say, would undermine the synergies associated with
tightly timed feeds (Jennings, 1993). On the other hand,
the analysts at Aviation Systems Research Corp. feel it is
a viable way of lowering hub-related costs (ASRC, 1993).
It is worth noting, however, that United Airlines'
new (1994) low-cost Shuttle senice operates rapid
turnaround flights, essentially Southwest Airlines-style
continuous hubbing, in its West Coast service area.
Regardless, events appear to be moving toward an
untenable state because everyone is scrambling. New
entrant airlines continue to appear on a regular basis,
and while a few come and go, the majority are gradually
expanding and eating away at megacarrier yields. The big
airlines, as noted earlier, are not standing still. They are
making major cuts in their management payrolls,
accelerating the transfer of short-haul routes to their
regional partners, and streamlining their fleets of aircraft;
the question is, are they making the correct changes? If
so, are they making the metamorphoses quickly enough?
Of particular relevance here, however, are some
controversial actions that may portend an all-out airline
economics war. In the West, American Airlines
transferred its San Jose hub to new jet entrant Reno Air
in the recent past. Importantly, Reno's short-haul
available seat miles (ASM) costs are dramatically lower
than American's and are in fact only slightly higher than
Southwest's ("Trends," 1995). American Airlines is able
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to indirectly maintain a corporate presence on northsouth Pacific coast routes through the coordination of
scheduling, frequent-flier programs, and gate proximity
with Reno Air. In the East, American is using the same
formula with Midway Airlines, whose ASM costs are 35%
lower than American's, at American's former RaleighDurham hub (Chandler, 1995). A similar program may
follow at American Airlines' other weak (though still
operational) hub, Nashville.
The farming out of megacarrier markets is nothing
new; the regionals have been inheriting these routes for
decades. What is revolutionary is the transfer of relatively
high-traffic markets, especially since the farmed out
routes are being earmarked for low-cost, low-wage
partner regionals and startups. This means that
prestigious pilot jobs, and other positions as well, are
being removed from large unionized airlines and handed
to generally non-union partner airlines. Major carrier
employees are not happy. However, American Airlines'
management claims that to compete with the likes of
Southwest, many short-haul routes must be moved to
regionals and startup jet partner carriers. This is a
debatable point, however, because the megacamers are
grossly inefficient on even their medium hauls when
compared with Southwest Airlines. Because American's
salaries are on average no higher than Southwest's, and
as American's flight crews say they are willing to operate
turnaround-type senice similar to Southwest's,
American's management has to take much of the
responsibility for the company's dismal performance
while Southwest was making handsome profits (ASRC,
1993; Babbitt, 1994). Of course, some airline managers
state that the extra expenses associated with hub-andspoke systems more than pay for themselves through
high-yield connecting and local O&D traffic. The upshot,
though, is that these systems did not work successfully for
the megacamers in recent years, especially for shorter
flights operating to and through the hubs.
The widespread, unprecedented abandonment of
short-haul routes by the major airlines to adjust to the
travel environment of the 1990s and to be competitive
with low-cost airlines has taken many forms. As detailed
above, American Airlines has already farmed out its
medium-to-high density short-haul routes along both
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coasts to new jet airline companies with no corporate
links to American Airlines or its parent corporation,
AMR. At the American Airlines mega-hubs in Dallas and
Chicago, American has accelerated its transfer of routes
to its AMR-owned regional turboprop partners. For the
first time, however, many of these Dallas or Chicago
transferred markets (for example, Dallas-Wichita), are
unquestionably jet-appropriate routes. American should
probably not be engineering the downgrading of service
to important medium-size cities. Although most of the
economic reasons for this substitution were discussed
earlier, one very important element, perhaps the most
critical factor in these decisions, relates not to the
economics of turboprops versus jets, but to the scope
clause in American Airlines' contract with its jet pilots.
A scope clause is written to ensure that the work
unionized employees do is owned by the employees; in
other words, scope clauses are written to prevent
management from going out and finding non-company
employees (who may be willing to perform the work for
less compensation) to do the in-house work The scope
clauses in airline pilot contracts specifically address what
kind of work may be camed out by other companies,
such as regional flights tolfrom small communities and,
more importantly, what types of work cannot be farmed
out. Among the megacamers, all are restricted by their
pilots' contracts from shifting the operations of large
aircraft (more than 70-90 passengers) to partner (codesharing) regional airlines. Some contracts also restrict
code-sharers from operating any and all pure jet
equipment, even small 50-passenger regional jets (Flint,
1995; Lewis, 1994). American Airlines circumvented the
scope clause in its pilots' contract when it transferred its
San Jose and Raleigh-Durham routes to wholly new
airline companies. However, as neither Reno Air nor
Midway Airlines has any corporate connection with
American Airlines or AMR, the new airlines simply
moved into their respective new hubs when American
pulled out; the marketing and frequent-flier ties followed.
Thus, the routes under scrutiny (San Jose-Seattle,
Raleigh-Boston, and many others) were never, and could
never be, because of American's contract with its pilots,
formally transferred to the jet startups. Thus, American
successfully dodged the scope clause in its pilots' contract
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with an ingenious tactic.
The other megacarrier airlines are using different
strategies to deal with their short-haul economic and
labor problems. United's Shuttle, as noted earlier,
inaugurated Southwest Airlines-style Boeing 737 quick
turnaround service on the West Coast in late 1994. While
United's management proclaims that the new operation
is financially successful, Southwest's chairman has stated
that his carrier's costs are still far lower than the
Shuttle's (Velocci, 1995). In any case, as nearly one-half
of Shuttle by United's passengers are connecting
travelers, the Shuttle and Southwest are not completely
comparable. Of note is the fact that along with
participating in the recent employee buyout of the
airline, United pilots agreed to allow the new airline
within an airline to operate Boeing jet equipment. There
are, however, restrictions on how large the Shuttle can
grow as compared to big United. That is because Shuttle
by United pilots fly more hours and are paid less money
than their counterparts at big United; they therefore
represent a threat.
Delta temtory, however, is where Battle 2000 may
begin. As Delta Air Lines' scope clause in its pilots'
contract does not restrict code-sharing partners from
operating small jet aircraft, regional jets in Delta colors
were literally crisscrossing America from north-to-south
and east-to-west by mid-1995 (Flint, 1995). Operating out
of Cincinnati and Salt Lake City, respectively, Delta
Connection partners Comair and SkyWest are flying
significant fleets of 50-passenger Canadair Regional Jets
on long, thin routes such as Omaha-Cincinnati (Comair)
and Eugene-Salt Lake City (SkyWest). In the Northeast,
Delta Connection's Business Express is using three 70passenger BAeIAVRO RJ70 jets to ferry passengers to
Delta's New York (JFK) hub. Although these flights
represent merely a small fraction of former Delta
mainline routes, they are apparently a precursor to the
acquisition of a sizable fleet of medium-size jets by the
largest of Delta's code-sharing partners, Atlantic
Southeast Airlines ( M A ) (Lewis, 1995). Is it the
intention of ASA to merely add seat capacity to some of
the very busy short hops into Atlanta from cities like
Birmingham (134 miles) and Chattanooga (105 miles)?
Or, is it ASA's (read: Delta's) intention to make an
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attempt to compete head-to-head with low-cost jet
startups such as Valujet on routes such as AtlantaJacksonville (277 miles)? With ASA's very trim wage
and overall operating structures (compared with partner
Delta or any megacarrier airline), a jet-equipped ASA
might be able to deliver a punishing or even fatal blow to
all Atlanta-region new entrant competition, including the
much vaunted Valujet.
Of course, the pilots at Delta Air Lines are
vehemently opposed to the transfer of any sizable Delta
routes to a low-wage regional carrier planning to use
medium-size jets to replace somewhat larger Delta jets.
As far as Delta pilots are concerned, management would
be violating the scope clause of its contract by such an
action. Perhaps it is merely the intention of Delta
management to intimidate its pilots (through actual
andlor threatened large-scale jet operations at ASA,
Business Express, Comair, and SkyWest) into agreeing to
the wage and work-rule concessions necessary for starting
an Atlanta-based Delta branded replica of Shuttle by
United.
From a wider perspective, Delta management's
negotiations with its pilots may not bode well for new
entrant jet airlines or the public at large; both would
appear threatened by a corporate metamorphosis
resulting in a much stronger Delta Air Lines. There are
some analysts who say the days of scope clauses in airline
employee contracts are numbered (Lewis,1994). What
can be said with absolute certainty, however, is that more
and more moderately dense short- and medium-length
routes are being farmed out to regional partner airlines
that are lean operations paying relatively low wages;
indeed, the pace of such route transfers is accelerating. It
is also true that regional airlines are increasing their
ownership of pure, although smaller, jet aircraft.
Is it conceivable, therefore, that in the near future
the megacarrier airlines will have so supplied their lowcost partners with routes and, indirectly, equipment, that
the partners will be used as weapons to eliminate new
startup competition?

CONCLUSION
It would be naive to make the assumption that the
grandfather airlines are willingly sacrificing important
short- and medium-haul, medium-density markets to the
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new jet entrants. Still, it is not difficult to come to that
conclusion given the tremendous strides new low-cost jet
camers have made in the last half-decade amid a massive
retreat by the grandfather airlines. The latters' required
replacement service invariably translates to turboprop
equipment: nice airplanes, but ill-suited in every
competitive way to the task at hand. This insult to cities
such as Fresno, Jackson, MidlandIOdessa, Portland (ME),
Syracuse, Wichita, and scores of others is the bread and
butter of jet startups coast to coast.
Megacarrier management is not unaware of these
facts and is likely quite cognizant of the ill will conveyed
to some of its best customers when it pulls its jets from
medium-size cities. Today's lost Fresno-Los Angeles
customer is tomorrow's lost Fresno-Frankfurt passenger.
To remain competitive, the megacamers must find
some way of operating on a level playing field with the

masses of low-cost jet entrants. Some say it i s already a
lost cause; it is simply too late for the retreating
dinosaurs. However, there is considerable evidence
indicating otherwise. It is becoming apparent that the
grandfatherairlinesare advancing, although cautiously,by
entering into partnerships with selected independent
startups, such as Reno Air, creating low-cost subsidiaries
in their own organizations (for example, Shuttle by
United), and, perhaps most importantly, artfully
negotiating with their pilots' unions to relax scope
clauses prohibiting regional code-sharing partners from
operating medium-sizejet equipment. Once the co-opting
of selected startup airlines and the renegotiating of scope
clauses are complete, the megacarriers may well possess
sufficient low-cost ammunition to destroy new entrant jet
airlines at wi1l.o
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